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ASSESSING AGOSTINI V. FELTON IN LIGHT OF 
LEMON V. KURTZMAN: THE COMING OF AGE IN THE 
DEBATE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATED SCHOOLS 
AND STATE AID 
R. Craig Wood* & Michael C. Petko** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The long litigious history of the Establishment Clause ex-
poses the difficulty that various legislative bodies have had in 
maintaining a consistent interpretation of neutrality toward 
religion. The inability of courts to determine clear guidelines 
for interpreting the relationship between Church and State 
creates ambiguity in the various legislative attempts to benefit 
religion through funding educational programs. Although some 
cases appear to present clear guidelines, they actually fail to 
provide comprehensible results. 1 The result is an increase in 
the tension of the twin clauses of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution: "[C]ongress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof."2 The duality created by these two clauses reinforces 
the principle that the government shall not use its legal powers 
to coerce citizens into supporting the beliefs of one religion over 
another, or to provide direct funding toward promoting any re-
ligion. This amendment also prohibits the creation of laws that 
infringe upon an individual's right to practice religion accord-
ing to the dictates of his or her chosen faith. 3 
* R. Craig Wood is the B.O. Smith Research Professor in the Department of Edu-
cational Leadership at the College of Education University of Florida. 
** Michael C. Petko is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Educational Lead-
ership at the College of Education at the University of Florida. 
1. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I,§ 1. 
3. However, the Supreme Court has even attempted to overcome this barrier 
with the doctrine of public interest, or government interest for the public good. Bob 
1 
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This First Amendment struggle has led to complex court 
decisions that are often difficult for local policy makers to fol-
low. Thomas Jefferson originally proposed the concept of "sepa-
ration of Church and State" in a letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association in Danbury, Connecticut, on January 1, 1802. The 
Supreme Court's application of Jefferson's statement to the is-
sue of funding educational programs within religiously affili-
ated educational institutions seemed to culminate in its deci-
sion in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 4 
This paper traces the development in First Amendment 
freedom of religion jurisprudence where it overlays education 
issues. Part II will address the development of the Lemon test. 
Part III will trace the shift in jurisprudence brought by Agos-
tini. Part IV will analyze the novel approach of using the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in this area. Part V reviews the 
effects of recent decisions and concludes with a discussion of 
possible ramifications of the current jurisprudence. 
II. LEMON V. KURTZMAN 
Lemon v. Kurtzman centered on the constitutionality of a 
statute in Pennsylvania, which provided financial support to 
non-public elementary and secondary schools. The program 
supplemented non-public teachers' salaries to the same levels 
as those of public school teachers and reimbursed funds to the 
private schools for textbooks and other instructional materials. 
The statute provided that the salaries, textbooks, and materi-
als had to be used for classes teaching strictly secular subjects. 
The Court also considered the constitutionality of a similar 
program in Rhode Island, which provided direct payments to 
teachers in private schools who taught secular subjects. 
Both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the basis that 
they clearly transgressed the First Amendment's prohibition of 
government "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983), provides the clearest example of 
the Court's willingness to override individual religious belief if it were in violation of 
public policy. See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986); O'Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345-46 (1987); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988). 
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."5 Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority opinion stated: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not fos-
ter "an excessive government entanglement with religion."6 
Notwithstanding the influence of the separatists' doctrine, 
the Court felt that total separation of Church and State was 
not practical or warranted. The Court stated: 
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between 
church and state; total separation is not possible in an abso-
lute sense. Some relationship between government and relig-
ious organizations is inevitable. Fire inspections, building and 
zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory 
school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and per-
missible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption be-
fore us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to ascer-
tain that the exempt property was in fact being used for 
religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement 
must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 
"wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending 
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. 7 
The Court further stressed that the holding in Lemon was 
not to be construed into a strict "legalistic minuet in which pre-
cise rules and forms must govern."8 Rather, the Court held that 
each case should determine "the character and purposes of the 
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the 
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the gov-
ernment and the religious authority."9 
In developing the Lemon test, the Court relied on Allen 10 
and Walz11 to undergird its view of Church and State relations. 
In Allen, the Court allowed for the loaning of secular textbooks 
5. Id. at 612. 
6. I d. (citations omitted). 
7. Id. at 614 (citations omitted). 
8. Id. 
9. !d. at 614·15. 
10. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
11. Walz v. Tax Comm'rs, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
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to students in parochial schools. The Court determined that 
secular textbooks provided by the state were not instrumental 
in the teaching of religion because secular and religious teach-
ings were not that intertwined.l2 It also cited Walz13 to support 
the third prong of the Lemon test. The Court opined that direct 
aid or subsidy of religion by the government would create a po-
tentially dangerous relationship with a harness of administra-
tive enforcement that would burden both parties. 14 
Lower court decisions employed the three-prong test and 
ruled in favor of plaintiffs who alleged that a school district or 
state school system was unconstitutionally involved in bene-
fiting parochial schools. 15 However, other cases began to erode 
the decision of Lemon. 16 The influence of the Lemon test, while 
still substantial, has declined over time. 17 
In Mueller v. Allen, 18 a Minnesota statute allowed parents 
to deduct educational expenses, such as tuition, textbooks, and 
transportation from state income taxes. Ten years earlier, in 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 19 the courts found a similar deduction unconstitutional. 
In Nyquist, the reimbursements were only for private school 
12. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
13. See id. at 614-615. 
14. In Lemon, Justice Burger quoted from Walz: "Obviously a direct money sub-
sidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmen-
tal grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relation-
ships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards." ld. at 621 quoting 
Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. 
15. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756 (1973); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Roemer v. Bd. of 
Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1979); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek 
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 356-57, n.G (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
16. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Board of Educ. of Westside 
Comm. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
17. Although Lemon did maintain a considerable influence upon the court for 
many years, there were decisions that demonstrated the Court's propensity to adjust 
its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. These cases have created an under-
standing that religious views must be accorded the same constitutional guarantee as 
any other opinion. In effect, the Court was refining its position towards an under-
standing of the second half of the Establishment Clause, which deals with the govern-
ment's charge not to create laws that inhibit free exercise of religion. Cases have been 
brought in which the Court has ultimately permitted religious groups to use public 
school and university facilities and to have access to student support funds for religious 
publications. See Rosenberger v. Rectors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
18. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
19. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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parents while the Minnesota statute applied to all parents. The 
Supreme Court found that the statute under examination in 
Mueller did not primarily benefit religious institutions because 
all parents could take advantage of the tax deductions. Fur-
thermore, the Establishment Clause was not violated because 
the law channeled assistance through the parents and not di-
rectly to the schools. Therefore, public funds became available 
only through the choice of the individual parents. The Court 
ruled, regarding the entanglement issue, that since the Minne-
sota program required a minimal amount of textbook monitor-
ing, the program would not qualify as excessive.20 
The Court felt that "a religious organization's enjoyment of 
merely incidental benefits does not violate the prohibition 
against the primary advancement or establishment of relig-
ion."21 The Court also stated, "the provision of benefits to so 
broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular ef-
fect."22 The Court's decision in Mueller created a fine line be-
tween benefit to institutions and benefit to individuals. Later 
decisions, in Witters and Zobrest23 strengthen that line leading 
to a newer understanding of the Establishment Clause outside 
of the Lemon test. 
In Witters u. Washington Department of Services for the 
Blind, 24 a vocational rehabilitation assistance program was 
challenged because it had been used to support a visually-
impaired student who, at the time he applied for public funds, 
was attending a private religious college. The challenge 
brought before the court alleged that the funding was unconsti-
tutional. Following the rationale of similar cases, the Supreme 
Court based its Establishment Clause question on the second 
prong of the Lemon test. The Court found that the state had a 
neutral policy of generally providing grants for qualified stu-
dents to attend institutions of their choice, and had no influ-
ence on how students chose to use such grants. The Court 
found such a neutral focus to be Constitutional although the 
money ultimately flowed to a sectarian college, it was through 
20. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403. 
21. Sec Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1973). 
22. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)). 
23. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zo-
brest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
24. !d. 
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the student and for tha:t student's benefit. 25 The Court later 
stated in Agostini that such neutral programs as IDEA and Ti-
tle I did not advance religion by relieving sectarian institutions 
of any cost they would otherwise have. It further opined that 
these programs provided services that were not part of the pro-
grams of the religiously affiliated schools and were not provid-
ing an incentive to attend such institutions or to provide any 
support to these institutions. 26 
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 27 parents 
sued on behalf of their disabled child. The parents requested a 
public school district to supply an interpreter for their deaf 
child while she was attending a private school. The parents ar-
gued that the school district was financially responsible under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . The school 
district argued that since the student would be in a private re-
ligious school, providing a public school interpreter would be in 
violation of the Establishment Clause under Lemon. The Su-
preme Court ruled that providing a public school employee to a 
disabled student in a private school would not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. The evidence did not support the pre-
sumption that a public employee would inevitably inculcate re-
ligion. 
The Court thus moved away from the three-prong test es-
tablished in Lemon. Many of the Justices were not willing to 
base their decisions in similar issues on one single test. 28 How-
ever, the Court was willing to apply criteria other than the 
Lemon test in determining the separation between Church and 
State. 
The struggle to maintain neutrality is exacerbated by the 
influences of those who feel that government money should be 
available to all regardless of belief, of those who are strict sepa-
rationists, and of varied court decisions. These influences also 
25. ld. at 487-88. 
26. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997). Although the Court had 
found in Aguilar that the distribution of Title I services to students in the NYCSD vio-
lated the Establishment Clause as determined by Lemon, the NYCSD was not trying to 
advance a religious institution but merely attempting to fulfill the mandate of Title I: 
i.e., providing services to students from both private and public schools. 
27. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
28. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687 (1994); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 
(1983). 
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appear within the decisions of the courts.29 Agostini v. Felton 
arises from this volatile background. 30 
III. AGOSTINI V. FELTON 
In Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court overturned two 
earlier rulings: School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,31 which 
addressed the constitutionality of a "Shared Time" program, 
and Aguilar v. Felton, 32 which addressed the disbursement of 
Title I public services of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965 ("ESEA") to parochial schools.33 
In Ball, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that 
the First Amendment clearly proscribes both the federal and 
the state government from "any active involvement of the sov-
ereign in religious activity." Citing the decision of Everson v. 
Board of Education, 34 Justice Brennan declared that the state 
and federal government should not pass laws that would aid 
any religion. Further, they should not pass laws that would 
provide tax revenue to support any religious institution. He 
stated: 
Providing for the education of school children is surely a 
praiseworthy purpose. But our cases have consistently recog-
nized that even such a praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot 
validate government aid to parochial schools when the aid has 
the effect of promoting a single religion generally or when the 
aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious. 35 
This decision would regard any attempt to assist a religious or-
ganization by the government as unconstitutional. 36 The Court 
29. In Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court declared 
that a New Jersey program that provided bus transportation for private school stu-
dents was constitutional. However, in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty u. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Court declared unconstitutional a New York City 
program that was designed to benefit nonpublic schools because the program had the 
affect of aiding and advancing religion. Both programs had the affect of aiding those 
who attended religious programs, but the Court decided the cases on different interpre-
tations. 
30. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
31. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
32. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
33. Id. at 403 (explaining Title I services). 
34. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
35. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. 
36. Justice Brennan cited cases in the decision which demonstrated the Court's 
concern that any relations between public teachers and private schools would endanger 
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postulated in Ball and Aguilar that the possibility of inculcat-
ing a religious belief was highly probable if public school teach-
ers were to work in private sectarian schools. 
Aguilar v. Felton37 addressed the New York City School 
District's ("NYCSD") disbursement of Title I services. The 
NYCSD sent public school teachers into parochial schools to 
provide Title I services under the ESEA. The school district at-
tempted to secularize the program in the private religiously af-
filiated schools by following strict guidelines. First, the city as-
signed teachers to religious schools on a voluntary basis. 
Second, the school district supervised teachers with personnel 
who visited each school once a month. These supervisors in 
turn reported to another administrative level. Third, each 
teacher was instructed to avoid involvement in religious activi-
ties and to bar religious materials from the classrooms. 38 
Lastly, materials for Title I services were provided entirely by 
the government. Despite these precautions, the Supreme Court 
declared the program unconstitutional in light of the three-
prong test established in Lemon. 39 
In 1995 the NYCSD and parents of parochial school stu-
dents brought suit in U.S. District Court to reverse the ruling 
in Aguilar v. Felton under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b).40 When its requirements are met, this rule allows a 
party to escape implementation of the final judgment. The 
plaintiffs argued that recent decisions under the Establishment 
Clause and comments by the majority in the Supreme Court's 
recent ruling in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village 
the public school employee's neutrality by causing the employee to somehow be pres-
sured to inculcate religious doctrine into the curriculum. See Stone v. Graham, 449 
U.S. 39, (1980); Meek, 421 U.S. at 370; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; Levitt v. Comm'r for 
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
37. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402. 
38. The private schools were required to provide classrooms with no religious arti-
facts. 
39. Justice Brennan wrote that "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continu-
ing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are 
obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot 
be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs 
and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These 
prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between State 
and Church." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 410 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619). 
40. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1996). 
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School District u. Grumet41 nullified or drastically changed the 
decisions of Aguilar and Ball. The district court admitted that 
Aguilar might no longer be valid but refused to overturn the 
ruling against the NYCSD, noting that it lacked the jurisdic-
tion to overturn Supreme Court precedent. 42 The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari for review on appeal by the NYCSD. 43 
IV. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(B)(5) 
The use of Rule 60(b)(5) was a novel attempt by the peti-
tioners in Agostini to obtain Supreme Court review of Aguilar. 
This rule states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may relieve a party, from a final judgment [or] 
order for the following reasons: ... [or when] (5) it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion."44 The Supreme Court recognized that Rule 60(b)(5) was 
an appropriate motion when there had been a change in the 
factual conditions or in the law.45 
The petitioners had initially filed under Rule 60(b)(5), re-
questing that the District Court relieve the NYCSD from an 
earlier ruling after Aguilar. The petitioners made this request 
because there had been a change in the costs of administering 
the Title I services and because Aguilar was no longer good 
law. The District Court agreed with the petitioners that per-
haps the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar should be 
changed, but it did not grant relief because there were no clear 
court cases that had specifically overturned Aguilar. However, 
the District Court did acknowledge that the use of Rule 60(b)(5) 
was justified in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
District Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Using Rule 60(b)(5), the petitioners made three basic argu-
41. 512 U.S. 748 (1994). In this ruling two concurring and three dissenting jus-
tices made various arguments indicating a desire to overturn Aguilar. See R. Craig 
Wood & Luke M. Cornelius, Kiryas Joel II: The Continuing Controversy Of Church And 
State Separation, 15 ED. LAW RPTR. 227 (1997). 
42. The District Court's unpublished decision is cited in the record. This decision 
was also upheld without comment by the Second Circuit in 1996. See Felton v. Secre-
tary, 101 F. 3d 1394 (1996). 
43. Agostini v. Felton, 519 U.S. 1086 (1997). 
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (1996). 
45. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992); Railway 
Em pl. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1961); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976). 
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ments to justify overturning Aguilar. First, they argued that 
since Aguilar, the costs of compliance had increased so signifi-
cantly that the factual situation was altered, warranting a 
modification or injunction. Second, they argued that the ma-
jority opinion in Kiryas Joel concerning Aguilar constituted a 
change in the law. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that recent Su-
preme Court Establishment Clause rulings had undermined 
Aguilar. 
The Court's assessment of the petitioner's arguments re-
sulted in the review of Aguilar, but the Court was not per-
suaded by two of the arguments proposed. First, the Court re-
jected the expense argument because the extra expense was 
accounted for in the Aguilar decision and did not constitute a 
change in factual situation under Rule 60(b).46 Next, the Court 
considered whether the various comments made regarding 
Aguilar in the Kiryas Joel decision proved a change in the law 
under Rule 60(b). The Kiryas Joel ruling dealt with the crea-
tion of a special school district in New York City to encompass 
the inhabitants of an Orthodox Jewish sect. The school district 
was created to allow the particular Jewish group to maintain 
control of the Jewish children's education while receiving spe-
cial education services needy students. The plaintiffs noted 
that some of the Justices' comments in dicta indicated a will-
ingness to reconsider Aguilar. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court noted that the issue of Aguilar was not under considera-
tion in Kiryas Joel, and nothing in the Kiryas Joel ruling re-
lated to Aguilar. 47 
The majority opinion did agree with the petitioners' final 
argument that subsequent Supreme Court rulings meant that 
Aguilar was no longer good law. 48 The Court's decision to over-
turn Aguilar ultimately relied on two specific rulings: Witters u. 
Washington Department of Services for Blind49 and Zobrest u. 
Catalina Foothills School Dist. 50 Zobrest erased the perceived 
symbolic union of Church and State created by the presence of 
public school teachers in parochial schools. Since this issue had 
46. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216. 
47. Id. at 217. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had concurred in the judgment but 
argued against Aguilar. Justices Thomas and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented and questioned the continued viability of Aguilar. 
48. Id. at 218. 
49. 474 u.s. 481 (1986). 
50. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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been central to the rulings of Aguilar, Meek, and Ball, the Zo-
brest ruling implicitly overturned this aspect of the previous 
cases. Hence, the Court ruled that Zobrest created new law in 
holding that the presence of public employees in parochial 
schools did not create a symbolic union of Church and State so 
long as those public employees performed only secular func-
tions.51 
The Court cited Witters where it considered a state policy 
that allowed a state to issue tuition grants to students attend-
ing a sectarian college to pursue a degree allowing them to be-
come Christian pastors, missionaries, or youth directors. Since 
the state had a neutral policy of granting funds to qualified 
students to attend institutions of their choice and had no influ-
ence on how students chose to use such grants, the Court de-
termined the program to be Constitutional even when moneys 
ultimately flowed to a sectarian college. The rationale was that 
the funds were for the benefit of the individual. 52 
Finding that Witters and Zobrest had caused substantive 
changes in the law, the Court determined that the original 
Aguilar ruling was eligible for review under Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court then turned to the 
Lemon criteria to determine the appropriateness of the original 
program of conducting Title I instruction within parochial 
school classrooms. In applying the three-pronged Lemon test, 
the Court found that Title I clearly had a secular purpose be-
cause it sought to benefit students who were educationally un-
derprivileged. The Court found that Title I did not lead to gov-
ernmental indoctrination, nor did it select particular students 
based on religious affiliation. The primary effect of Title I was 
to enhance a child's secular education, while neither advancing 
nor inhibiting religion. 
There remained the issue of excessive entanglement be-
tween Church and State, which had been an important feature 
of the Aguilar decision because of the monitoring feature of the 
NYCSD program. In Agostini, the Court determined that the 
entanglement engendered by offering Title I programs in paro-
chial schools was no greater than if those programs were of-
fered in some other location. The Court determined that there 
would be some need for cooperation between public and paro-
51. Id. at 224. 
52. See id. at 225. 
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chial schools regardless whether the instruction took place in-
side the parochial school or in a bus parked a few yards away. 53 
The District Court case Committee for Public Education 
and Religious Liberty v. Secretary, 54 decided a year before Ag-
ostini, demonstrates the difficult nature of the NYCSD's abil-
ity to deliver Title I services according to the statute's require-
ment that the services be delivered to all eligible students 
regardless of religious affiliation. The plaintiffs argued unsuc-
cessfully that the alternative program implemented by the 
NYCSD still resulted in excessive entanglement and symbolic 
union of Church and State. Much of the record dealt with the 
issue of how the Title I program in New York and other cities 
should be financed. To remain in compliance with both the 
Court's ruling in Aguilar and the mandate of Congress that all 
Title I eligible children be served equally, regardless of which 
school they attended, the U.S. Department of Education re-
quired districts to use "off the top" funding. 55 The cost of com-
pliance, including the cost of leased sites and mobile instruc-
tional units, would initially be funded and then the per-student 
allotment would be determined from the remainder of Title I 
funds. The district court further noted that not only did the 
Federal Department of Education mandate this funding ap-
proach, but that it had survived multiple legal challenges as 
well. 56 Consequently, the requirements of Aguilar not only re-
duced funding available for direct Title I instruction to paro-
chial school students, it also reduced the Title I funds available 
to public school students. 
Committee for Public Education also demonstrated the 
magnitude of this diversion of Title I funds in New York City. 
Exclusive of the actual instruction costs in the 1990-91 school 
year, the New York City public schools paid $11,739,588 to 
comply with the alternative plan designed in the wake of Agui-
lar. 57 While transporting children to nearby public schools was 
an option, the extreme problems of overcrowding and lack of fa-
53. See id. at 228. 
54. 942 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
55. ld. at 861-62. 
56. ld. at 861; See Barnes v. Cavazos, 966 F.2d 1056 (6'" Cir. 1992); Board of 
Educ. of City of Chicago v. Alexander, 983 F.2d 745 (7'" Cir. 1992). 
57. See Committee for Pub. Educ, 942 F.Supp at 852. This spending breaks down 
as follows: $280,402 for leased space, $225,711 for Computer Aided Instruction, 
$106,934 for maintenance, insurance, and drivers for the MIU's, and $11,126,541 for 
the lease of the MIU's. Id. 
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cilities in the NYCSD made this option increasingly difficult for 
the district. Therefore, the NYCSD was forced to divert funds 
from actual Title I instruction to auxiliary services in order to 
provide private and parochial school children with these serv-
ices in an acceptable manner. These costs were taken from the 
initial Title I fund. This meant that there was less money for 
both public and private school students since the balance had 
to be split between the remaining students. Although it was 
not a determinant in allowing for a rehearing under Rule 60(b), 
the Court viewed the injunction against the NYCSD as pun-
ishing secular and public students alike. 58 
The Supreme Court ruling in Agostini allowed public school 
districts to provide Title I services or other mandated programs 
such as IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) to 
children in parochial schools. The ruling recognized the unique 
circumstances in New York City and developed a policy that 
allowed the public schools to provide a neutral, non-sectarian 
benefit to all school children in an efficient and cost effective 
manner for the district. The ruling also allowed similar dis-
tricts the option to provide on-site Title I programs to private 
and parochial students. Consequently, local policy makers can 
make this decision based on local or individual criteria. Agos-
tini allows public schools greater freedom to determine the ap-
propriate manner and place in which to deliver mandatory pro-
grams to non-public school students. This ruling appears to 
remove the constraints that bar providing similar on-site serv-
ices to private and parochial school students. 
Another fiscal concept is that Agostini may lead to the le-
galization of vouchers for parochial school students. Much has 
been written regarding this issue.59 Most point to Justice 
O'Connor's quote of the vocational funding of tuition grants in 
Witters. Justice O'Connor clearly stated in Agostini that no in-
fringement of the Establishment Clause would be created if the 
state were to pay individual citizens who then pay private tui-
tion. She stated that: 
this transaction was no different from a State's issuing a pay-
58. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 212. 
59. Peter Applebome, Parochial Schools Ruling Heartens Voucher Backers, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B6; Daniel Wise, Parochial School Teaching May Be Paid by 
Federal Funds, THE NEW YORK L.J., June 24, 1997. See also Arval A. Morris, Com-
ment, Public Educational Services in Religious Schools: An Opening Wedge for Vouch-
ers?, 122 ED. LAW RPTR. 545 (1998). 
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check to one of its employees, knowing that the employee 
would donate part or all of the check to a religious institution. 
In both situations, any money that ultimately went to relig-
ious institutions did so only as a result of the generally inde-
pendent and private choices of individuals. 60 
However, nothing in this decision would indicate such a re-
sult. In making its decision, the Court was careful to frame the 
Title I program in terms of the child benefit theory. It made 
analogies between the decision in Agostini and its rulings in di-
rect child benefit cases like Board of Education of Central 
School District No. 1 v. Allen61 and Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion of the Township of Ewing.62 By contrast, the Court sought 
to demonstrate the difference between this case and cases 
where it rejected direct support, either in financial terms or in 
loans of personnel and material that could be used for religious 
purposes or to defray regular instructional expenses of private 
sectarian schools.63 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Agostini decision clearly stretched the boundaries of 
judicial prerogative, although it was decided with the intent to 
benefit children. In addition, the decision was made with finan-
cial considerations in mind. The uniqueness of this ruling 
should not lead anyone to speculate beyond the legal and fi-
nancial perspectives experienced by the NYCSD, and further 
analysis needs to be predicated upon those unique features. 
The Title I program addressed by Agostini provides educa-
60. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226. 
61. Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a New York State statute which required school dis-
tricts to purchase and loan textbooks to all children residing within the district, even 
those attending sectarian private schools). The Court found the loan of secular text-
books to students fulfilling compulsory attendance requirements by attending a private 
school was a religiously neutral benefit directly to the child and did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. ld. 
62. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township., 330 U.S. 1 (194 7) (determining 
that the use of public moneys to transport parochial students to school was a direct 
benefit to children, by providing them with free and safe transportation to school, and 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. An analogy was drawn in this case to using 
public dollars to provide other services to such children, such as police and fire protec-
tion, while attending a sectarian school). 
63. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 41:1 U.S. 825 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
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tional services directly to parochial and private school children 
which they would not otherwise receive from their non-public 
schools. Such instruction does not relieve these schools from 
any educational services they must already provide nor does it 
provide any public moneys for these schools. Any indirect bene-
fit to the sectarian school, such as improved student achieve-
ment, is incidental to the program and would occur regardless 
of where the instruction occurred. This is a major distinction 
from voucher programs and other schemes designed to provide 
public funding to parochial schools or relieve them of regular 
expenses such as equipment purchases and facilities mainte-
nance. 
The Supreme Court ruling in Agostini v. Felton is excep-
tional in that the court has directly overturned its own twelve 
year-old precedent in Aguilar v. Felton. As noted by the dissent 
in Agostini, the plaintiffs' successful use of Rule 60(b) to re-
verse the earlier ruling and stare decisis may well open the 
Court to numerous requests to reconsider other precedents. 64 
Therefore, it may be some time before the legal effects of this 
ruling are fully apparent. 
Equally important is that a careful reading of this ruling 
shows no language to suggest that the Court is on the verge of 
accepting voucher programs or any other direct subsidy of pa-
rochial education with public tax dollars. Indeed, the majority 
in this case is careful to point out the distinction between the 
direct provision of Title I services to children and previous 
rulings prohibiting the provision of direct public support to re-
ligious schools. By arguing for this reversal based on the child 
benefit theory, the Court has distanced Agostini from cases in-
volving direct public aid to parochial institutions. This is not to 
say that this Court or some future court may not someday 
choose to accept a voucher program as Constitutional, but there 
is no language in this ruling that either explicitly or implicitly 
supports such a conclusion. 
From a fiscal perspective, Agostini removes a great burden 
from the New York public schools which, when complying with 
the earlier Aguilar ruling, saw the annual diversion of millions 
of dollars from direct Title I. This ruling imposes no new man-
date or burden on public education. Rather, it merely provides 
local educational policy makers greater flexibility in providing 
64. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 254-58. 
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mandatory programs for non-public school students. It is im-
portant to note that the major plaintiff in this case was the 
Board of Education of the City of New York. The Court's ver-
dict in Agostini v. Felton represents a victory for all public 
school districts, especially those facing similar challenges. 
